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The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The
Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship*
Paul Brestt
As things now stand, everything is up for grabs.
Nevertheless:
Napalming babies is bad.
Starving the poor is wicked.
Buying and selling each other is depraved.
Those who stood up to and died resisting
Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol Pot-and General
Custer too-have earned salvation.
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned.
There is in the world such a thing as evil.
[All together now:] Sez who?
God help us.
-Arthur Leff*
I shall argue that the controversy over the legitimacy of judicial
review in a democratic polity-the historic obsession of normative
constitutional law scholarship'-is essentially incoherent and unre-
solvable.
The controversy is currently manifested in the body of scholarship
that centers on substantive due process decisions such as Griswold v.
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1. Normative constitutional scholarship assesses decisionmaking authority, competence,
procedures, criteria, and results, in contrast to, say, historical or sociological treatments
of constitutional law. See, e.g., Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, LAw &
ComuM.n. PxoB., Summer 1980, at 83 (treating fundamental rights decisions from a psy-
choanalytic and sociological perspective). -
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Connecticut,2 Eisenstadt v. Baird,' Roe v. Wade,4 and Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney.5 The judges and scholars who support judicial
intervention usually acknowledge that the rights at stake-variously
described in terms of privacy, procreational choice, sexual autonomy,
lifestyle choices, and intimate association-are not specified by the text
or original history of the Constitution. They argue that the judiciary
is nonetheless authorized, if not duty-bound, to protect individua,5
against government interference with these rights, which can be dis-
covered in conventional morality or derived through the methods of
philosophy and adjudication. The critics argue that judicial review
may be exercised only to enforce explicit constitutional provisions or
to ensure the integrity of representative government. They deny that
shared social values or fundamental rights exist or, in any case, that
courts can ascertain them.
The fundamental rights controversy deserves a place in a symposium
on legal scholarship: It is concerned with issues that lie at the core
of contemporary constitutional discourse-judicial methodology, in-
stitutional competence, and democratic theory. My own scholarly
agenda also influenced this choice of topic. Several years ago, I started
work on an affirmative theory of constitutional decisionmaking based
on interpretation-broadly conceived-of the history, structure, and
values of American society. I began by examining, and rejecting, "orig-
inalist" constitutional interpretation (that is, interpretation rooted
in the text and original understanding of the Constitution). 6 The
publication of John Hart Ely's important proposals for value-neutral
"representation-reinforcing" modes of judicial review7 occasioned a
detour, which confirmed my belief that such process-oriented strate-
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold held that a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use
of contraceptives could not be applied to married couples. Justice Douglas's opinion for
the Court relied on "penumbras" of various provisions of the Bill of Rights. Concurring
Justices invoked the Ninth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court has not since recurred to penumbral analysis.
3. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Eisenstadt invalidated a statute that, in effect, prohibited
distributing contraceptives to unmarried persons. The Court remarked that "[i]f the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe invalidated a Texas statute prohibiting abortions before
as well as after viability.
5. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), alf'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Doe sustained
Virginia's sodomy statute as applied to private consensual homosexual conduct. The
Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens voted
to note probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument.
6. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv.
204 (1980).
7. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DnsmusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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gies were covertly value-laden." As I turned to the possibilities of non-
originalist, substantive, value-oriented constitutional adjudication, I
became increasingly uncertain about the criteria we9 implicitly invoke
to assess theories of judicial review. In this article I conclude that no
defensible criteria exist.
Part I of the article reviews Alexander Bickel's discussion of ju-
dicial review in The Least Dangerous Branch,10 which presaged the
contemporary fundamental rights controversy and established its param-
eters. Part II describes the controversy itself and concludes with a
critique of fundamental rights theories. Part III argues that the al-
ternative strategies of judicial review proposed by the critics cannot
withstand the same kinds of criticisms they levy against fundamental
rights adjudication. Part IV shows how the fundamental rights con-
troversy is generated by a liberal theory of democracy, which Part V
locates in the broader context of modern liberal ideology.
I. The Legacy of Alexander Bickel
Although The Least Dangerous Branch was published in 1962, be-
fore the contemporary revival of substantive due process, the funda-
mental rights controversy cannot be understood without reference to
this extraordinarily influential book. Bickel sought both to justify
judicial review and to constrain it; in retrospect, he thereby embraced
both sides of the controversy.
The difficulty with judicial review, Bickel wrote, is that it is a
"counter-majoritarian force in our system":
[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legisla-
tive act ... it thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual
people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf
of the prevailing majority, but against it. That, without mystic
overtones, is what actually happens.".
Although legislative processes are often imperfectly representative and
the judiciary is not politically unresponsive, "nothing ...can alter
the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant institution in the
American democracy."1 2
8. Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 131 (1981).
9. By "we" I refer to normative constitutional law scholars, among whom I include
myself, and not to the "Americans," "right-thinking Americans," "civilized peoples," etc.,
whom we often refer to as "we."
10. A. BicKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
11. Id. at 16-17.
12. Id. at 17-19.
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Bickel's justification for judicial review began with the premise that
"the good society not only will want to satisfy the immediate needs
of the greatest number but also will strive to support and maintain
enduring general values. 1 13 He proceeded to argue that "courts have
certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislators
and executives do not possess": 14
[M]any actions of government have .. unintended or unappre-
ciated bearing on values we hold to have more general and per-
manent interest .... [W]hen the pressure for immediate results
is strong enough and emotions ride high enough, [legislators] will
ordinarily prefer to act on expediency rather than take the long
view . . . . Not merely respect for the rule of established prin-
ciples but the creative establishment and renewal of a coherent
body of principled rules-that is what our legislatures have proven
themselves ill equipped to give us.
Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the
insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends
of government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values
of a society .... [Courts can] appeal to men's better natures, to
call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in
the moment's hue and cry .... 15
This does not establish "full consistency with democratic theory,"'8
but it blunts the charge that judicial review is antidemocratic. "[I]f
the process is properly carried out, an aspect of the current-not only
the timeless, mystic-popular will will find expression in constitu-
tional adjudication. The result may be a tolerable accommodation
with the theory and practice of democracy."' 7
Despite his expansive description of the judicial function, Bickel's
commitment to fundamental rights adjudication was ambivalent and
coupled with a strong belief in judicial self-restraint.'" The contem-
porary proponents of fundamental rights adjudication tend to em-
brace his most expansive views. The critics emphasize the "counter-
majoritarian difficulty" and the need for restraint.
13. Id. at 27.
14. Id. at 25.
15. Id. at 24-26.
16. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 28.
18. See id. passim. Bickel's concern for judicial restraint became even more dominant
in his later writings. See A. BICKEL, THE MORAUTY OF CONSENT (1975); A. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME CoURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970). See generally Purcell, Alexander M.
Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 521 (1976) (tracing
Bickel's work).
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II. The Controversy over Methodology and the Source of Values
This part describes the internal discourse of the fundamental rights
controversy. It begins with seven representative scholars who favor
one or another form of fundamental rights adjudication. Although
not all of the proponents approve of all the Supreme Court's funda-
mental rights decisions, they share the mission of justifying the Court's
willingness to engage in this mode of adjudication. I treat the ad-
vocates of fundamental rights adjudication in two groups. The first
consists of consensus or conventional morality theorists. Dean Harry
Wellington of Yale believes that there are no fundamental rights as
such, but only a conventional morality to he judicially ascertained and
enforced.19 Michael Perry of Ohio State articulates a similar theory
but reaches significantly different results from Wellington.20 The
"rights" theorists in the second group-Laurence Tribe of Harvard,21
Kenneth Karst of U.C.L.A., 22 J. Harvey Wilkinson and G. Edward
White of Virginia,23 and David A. J. Richards of New York Uni-
versity24-draw on a variety of sources to derive fundamental rights
that enjoy some independence from conventional moral views.
In contrast to the profusion of articles supporting fundamental
rights adjudication, the scholarly literature contains relatively few
unsympathetic analyses. 25 I conclude by discussing the writings of the
three most prominent critics of the practice: Raoul Berger, a Charles
19. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
20. Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function
o1 Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Perry,
Ethical Function]; Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond)
Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Perry, Reflections].
Professor Perry has since adopted a different theory of judicial review. See M. Perry,
The Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of
Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary (forthcoming 1982) (Court, constrained by
Congress's power over the appellate jurisdiction, plays role in nation's moral development).
21. L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1978).
22. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
23. Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL
L. REv. 563 (1977).
24. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINS L.J. 957 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Richards, Sexual Autonomy]; Richards, Unnatural Acts and the
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1977);
D. RICHARnS, THE MORAL CxRTCISM or LAw (1977) (applying Rawlsian theory to con-
stitutional law).
25. I do not include Richard Epstein's Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name:
The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159, or similar articles criticizing particular de-
cisions but not discussing the methodology of fundamental rights adjudication.
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Warren Senior Fellow at Harvard, -" Robert Bork of Yale,27 and John
Hart Ely of Harvard. 28
A. The Proponents
1. Two Versions of Conventional Morality
Harry Wellington. Dean Harry Wellington argues that proper con.
stitutional adjudication closely resembles common-law adjudication.
Both consist of reasoning from principles rooted in conventional
morality and elaborated through judicial doctrine:
[W]hen dealing with legal principles a court must take a moral
point of view.t 29] Yet I doubt that one would want to say that a
court is entitled or required to assert its moral point of view.
Unlike the moral philosopher, the court is required to assert
ours. This requirement imposes constraints: Judicial reasoning
in concrete cases must proceed from society's set of moral prin-
ciples and ideals . . . . And that is why we must be concerned
with conventional morality, for it is there that society's set of
moral principles and ideals are located.30
Wellington defines conventional morality as "standards of conduct
which are widely shared in a particular society."31 A society's conven-
tional moral "principles" differ from its moral "ideals." Principles
impose obligations; ideals are "a guide to the virtuous, inviting him
'to carry forward beyond the limited extent which duty demands.' "32
Although a society's ideals "help us understand how its moral prin-
ciples apply in concrete situations,"3 3 judges are authorized to imple-
ment only its principles. To the claim that contemporary American
society is too heterogeneous to share conventional moral principles,
Wellington responds:
Although the sub-culture problem is real, too much can be
made of it. Much of the cleavage that results from diversity
manifests itself in interest group politics. Diverse groups can pur-
sue different policies while sharing a basically common morality.
26. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
27. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
28. J. ELY, supra note 7.
29. That is, it must base decisions on "principles, general in form and universal in
application." Wellington, supra note 19, at 243.
30. Id. at 244.
31. Id. (quoting H.L.A. HART, THE CONCET OF LAw 165 (1961)).
32. Id. at 245.
33. Id.
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More important, the melting pot phenomenon is a real one ....
The American people have a history and tradition which interact
with their common problems to fashion attitudes, values, and
aspirations that tend toward a dynamic, but nevertheless rela-
tively cohesive, society, and that make it possible to discern a
conventional morality.3 4
To discern a society's conventional morality, one must live in the
society, "become sensitive to it, experience widely, read extensively,
and ruminate, reflect, and analyze situations that seem to call moral
obligations into play. This task may be called the method of philos-
ophy,"3 5 and it is not adequately performed by legislators:
The major difficulty for the official charged with the task of de-
termining how the moral principles bear in a particular case is
in disengaging himself from contemporary prejudices which are
easily confused with moral principles. He must escape the passion
of the moment and achieve an appropriately historical perspec-
tive ....
.... [L]egislators, of course, are often professionally concerned
with morality . . . .But the environment in which legislators
function makes difficult a bias-free perspective. It is often hard
for law-makers to resist pressure from their constituents who re-
act to particular events . . .with a passion that conflicts with
common morality . . . . Nor is it an easy matter for legislators to
find conventional morality when there are well-organized interest
groups insisting upon moral positions of their own.36
By comparison, the process of adjudication "has some promise of fil-
tering out the prejudices and passions of the moment, some promise
of providing the judge with distance and a necessary historical per-
spective."37
Discerning conventional morality differs radically from deriving
rights independent of their basis in conventional morality. Welling-
ton characterizes "fundamental rights" as a terminological mistake be-
cause it implies that those rights have a special status derived from
the Constitution or imposed by the judge "as wise philosopher": 38
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as Holmes has said, does 'not enact Mr.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 246.
36. Id. at 248-49.
37. Id. at 248. With virtually no discussion, Wellington dismisses the methods of
behavioral science as too expensive and not up to the task of unpacking the complexities
of moral issues. Id. at 247.
38. Id. at 299.
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Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.' Ncur does it enact Mr. John Rawls's
A Theory of Justice."30 Rather, "It]he Court's task is to ascertain the
weight of the principle in conventional morality and to convert the
moral principle into a legal one by connecting it with the body of
constitutional law." 40
Wellington applies this approach to the regulation of contraception
and abortion. I pass over the first, noting only that he approves of
Griswold because the Connecticut anticontraceptive law interfered
with the conventionally rooted intimacy of the marital relationship,41
but finds Eisenstadt problematic because he doubts whether a con-
sensus protects the sexual intimacy of unmarried couples. 42
Wellington introduces the abortion issue by establishing the prin-
ciple that "every person has a right (qualified by context) to decide
what happens in or to his body." 43 He posits a hypothetical statute
making it a crime to remove a person's gall bladder except to save
her life. The law "deprives any person with a diseased gall bladder
of his or her liberty without due process of law" because it imposes
physical and psychological pain.44 Although the state has no con-
ceivable interest in insuring the survival of diseased gall bladders,
Wellington argues that this is not true of the survival of fetuses. The
analogy therefore does not establish that a woman has a constitution-
al right to an abortion if it will cause the death of the fetus.
Wellington argues that conventional morality nonetheless permits
abortion if the fetus was conceived through rape. His analysis pro-
ceeds from an example devised by the philosopher Judith Thomson: 45
You are kidnapped and taken to a hospital where a famous violinist
who has a fatal kidney ailment is plugged into your circulatory sys-
tem. If he is disconnected, he will die; otherwise, at the end of nine
months he will be cured and you will be unplugged, inconvenienced
but unharmed. "Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to that
situation?"4 6 Thomson answers "no," and Wellington agrees that this
is "the only answer that can be defended by an appeal to our atti-
tudes and practices." 47 He also agrees that the "example [cannot] be
distinguished from abortion where pregnancy results from rape."48
39. Id. at 285.
40. Id. at 284.
41. See id. at 292-95.
42. See id. at 296-97.
43. Id. at 305.
44. Id.
45. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-49 (1971).
46. Id. at 49.
47. Wellington, supra note 19, at 307.
48. Id.
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The fact that a majority of states permitted abortions to preserve
the mother's life shows that this practice was also supported by con-
ventional morality. But Wellington believes that Roe v. Wade went
too far in permitting abortions to preserve the mother's physical or
mental health. To be sure, the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code would permit such abortions, and the ALI is "some evi-
dence of society's moral position on these questions. It is indeed better
evidence than state legislation, for the Institute, while not free of
politics, is not nearly as-subject to the pressures of special interest
groups as is a legislature." 4 The Institute's recommendation does not
reflect social consensus, however: "I do not understand how, by no-
ticing commonly held attitudes, one can conclude that a healthy fetus
is less important than a sick mother."'50
Dean Wellington's source of values for constitutional adjudication
is conventional morality elucidated by intuitionistic reasoning. By
intuitionistic reasoning, I refer to the method of testing a posited
outcome (e.g., "a woman has a right to abort a fetus conceived by
rape") by comparing it to seemingly analogous situations about which
the decisionmaker has clear intuitions (the kidnapped person needn't
stay hooked up to the violinist). Philosophers and lawyers often ar-
gue about moral and legal principles in this manner.51 In effect, Well-
ington employs it as a device for interpolating between conventional
moral principles to apply them to particular situations.
Michael Perry. For Professor Perry, as for Dean Wellington, the
Court's task is limited to ascertaining and enforcing conventional
morality.52 Judicial review is designed "to correct the occasional myo-
pia, to moderate the occasional excesses of the political processes":5 3
49. id. at 311.
50. Id.
51. Of course, the writer takes the chance that the reader will not share her in-
tuition or that, because the mind-experiment is so far removed from the reader's ex-
perience, he will not feel much confidence in the validity of the intuition. See also
Hare, Abortion and the Golden Rule, 4 PHILOsoPHY & Pun. AFF. 201 (1975) (criticism
of intuitionistic moral reasoning).
52. "[The Court should not function as an antimajoritarian agency . . . . Thus,
when an individual Justice knows that his own views diverge from those of conventional
moral culture, his responsibility is to defer to the public morals." Perry, Ethical Function,
supra note 20, at 731. Perry criticizes Judge Merhige for basing his dissent in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901
(1976) on a libertarian principle not rooted in conventional morality:
The dimensions of the right of privacy are determined by conventional morality.
Whether or not the sodomy statute challenged in Doe violates the right of privacy
is a question to be answered not by deductions from a Millian philosophical prin-
ciple, but by a careful (if inevitably imprecise) inquiry into the contemporary char-
acter of conventional American attitudes toward homosexuality.
Perry, Reflections, supra note 20, at 439 (footnotes omitted).
53. Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 20, at 716 (footnotes omitted).
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A law may remain on the books for so long that it no longer
reflects contemporary moral culture .... Or a piece of legisla-
tion might have been put on the books only because a suffi-
ciently interested minority has lobbied-and perhaps bartered-
for it ....
Fervent minority lobbying and bartering is not wrong in a
pluralist democracy. But when trying to ascertain the content of
the public morals, it simply will not do to pretend that mi-
nority success is a conclusive index of conventional moral cul-
ture.54
In performing its function, the Court should look to "cases estab-
lishing relevant 'first principles'; cases involving related or analogous
issues; evidence indicating a shift in the moral culture, such as re-
cently enacted legislation dealing with an aspect of the issue before
the Court; or credible studies of shifts in contemporary social at-
titudes": 55
Ultimately, however, each individual Justice... must ask wheth-
er particularized claims about that culture resonate with him or
her. The Justices, after all, are not unfamiliar with conventional
mores and attitudes; in truth it is unlikely that a very unconven-
tional person would become a Justice of the Supreme Court. The
collectivity which is the Supreme Court is, in this sense, a jury,
and as a matter of political reality the Court is a jury that gen-
erally will reflect and mediate the temper of the dominant po-
litical and moral culture.58
Perry's inquiry differs from Wellington's in two significant respects.
First, Perry is explicitly concerned with "public morality": The rele-
vant question is "not whether the conduct is disapproved by conven-
tional morality, but whether conventional morality supports state en-
forcement of its disapproval through criminal and civil sanctions."
517
Second, Perry's Court holds the legislature to society's moral ideals,58
while Wellington's enforces only lower level conventional moral prin-
ciples.
54. Id. at 727-28.
55. Id. at 730 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 730-31 (footnotes omitted).
57. Perry, Reflections, supra note 20, at 447. For example, "the issue is not whether
conventional morality disfavors sodomy, but only whether it supports treating sodomy
as an issue implicating the public morals, by criminalizing consensual sodomous conduct
by adults in private." Id.
58. "American society, though committed to certain politico-philosophical principles
and ideals ... often finds it difficult to order its affairs consistently with those ideals. ...
The courts can serve society well by keeping these ideals in focus, or by bringing them
back into focus." Id. at 431-32 (footnote omitted).
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The two scholars' conclusions differ widely. Unlike Wellington,
Perry finds Eisenstadt entirely unproblematic"o and Roe v. Wade quite
an easy case! 0 Although Wellington does not discuss antihomosexual
legislation, his analysis of the contraception and abortion cases in-
dicates that he would sustain laws prohibiting sodomy. Perry easily
concludes that the punishment of homosexual conduct is not grounded
in conventional morality. He relies on the widespread nonenforce-
ment of sodomy laws, resolutions of various professional associations
calling for the decriminalization of private consensual sexual behavior,
and the American Psychiatric Association's decision to remove homo-
sexuality from its list of mental diseases.0 1
2. Rights Theories
a. The Theories. Laurence Tribe devotes one hundred pages of
his treatise to elaborating broadly defined "rights of privacy and per-
sonhood, 6" - with the ultimate objective of identifying "those attri-
butes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood."03 In
contrast to Wellington and Perry, Tribe explicitly rejects the limita-
tions of social consensus:
[A]ttempts to ground constitutional rights of privacy or person-
hood in conventional morality.., are helpful but have inherently
limited power. For we are talking, necessarily, about rights of in-
dividuals or groups against the larger community, and against the
majority . . . . Subject to all of the perils of antimajoritarian
judgment, courts-and all who take seriously their constitutional
oaths-must ultimately define and defend rights against govern-
ment in terms independent of consensus or majority will."4
Kenneth Karst seeks to establish a freedom of "intimate association,"
which he defines as "a close and familiar personal relationship with
another that is in some significant way comparable to a marriage or
a family relationship."6 5 Karst links the freedom of intimate associa-
tion to other domains of constitutional doctrine, especially to the
equal protection clause:
59. Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 20, at 732.
60. Id. at 733. Public opinion polls indicate "that the Court's implicit evaluation of
conventional moral culture vis-a-vis restrictive abortion legislation was essentially ac-
curate." Id.
61. Perry, Reflections, supra note 20, at 447-48.
62. L. TUiBE, supra note 21, at 886-990.
63. Id. at 889 (quoting 52d A.L.I ANN. MTc. 42-43 (remarks of Paul Freund)).
64. Id. at 896 (footnotes omitted); cf. Tribe, supra note 21, at 573-74 (discussing sources
of constitutional rights).
65. Karst, supra note 22, at 629.
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The substantive heart of the F_,urteenth Amendment . .. is a
principle of equal citizenship, a presumptive guarantee of the
right to be treated by the organized society as a respected, re-
sponsible, participating member. Some of the values in intimate
association are closely bound up with a person's sense of self:
caring, commitment, intimacy, self-identification. When the state
seriously impairs those values by restricting intimate association,
the equal protection clause is at its most demanding, insisting on
justifications of the highest order if the state is to be allowed to
persist. 66
Wilkinson and White argue for a freedom of "lifestyle choices,"
which they expressly limit to matters of "domestic companionship,
sexual conduct, and personal appearance." 67 These "choices them-
selves are intimate"; "for the most part [they] involve little prospect
of direct or intentional harm to others"; and they are indispensable "in
fulfilling individuality."618 Although the authors acknowledge that "life-
style freedoms are not expressly safeguarded" by the Constitution, they
write that "the spirit of the Constitution operates to protect them":69
A compelling mission of the Constitution has been to protect
sanctuaries of individual behavior from the hands of the state ....
[T]he Bill of Rights teaches that human dignity is meaningless
without a proper measure of personal freedom from governmental
interference.
That dignity is seriously diminished unless it includes those
choices that most express our uniqueness and individuality. By our
style of dress and appearance, our personal associations, our man-
ner of speech, and our sexual behavior we seek to express our
uniqueness as humans and to realize our destinies as individual
beings .... [N]othing is more central to self-realization and ful-
fillment than these very personal decisions.
. ..The Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
66. Id. at 663. See also Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) (deriving con-
stitutional rights from concept of citizenship).
67. Wilkinson & White, supra note 23, at 614.
68. Id. at 615. The authors grant that choices involving education and career also
express one's individuality; but those "depend greatly upon economic means or personal
ability," while "there is a greater universality to lifestyle choices." Id. at 615.
Thus it is ultimately irrelevant to our analysis that the right to choose a career
seems easily more important than the right to wear long hair. Career choices simply
lack, in our view, the degree of personal intimacy necessary to characterize them as
lifestyle choices. Expanding the concept of lifestyle freedom to include all important
marketplace decisions having some personal element would eventually weaken the
force of a lifestyle right and dilute the protection our most intimate choices ought
to receive.
Id. at 615-16 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 611.
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has increasingly served to protect powerless minorities-casualties
of the majoritarian political process . . . . [T]he subjects of life-
style protection are likely to be persons unable to gain redress
through the political process ....
The purposes served by protection of lifestyle choices are also
strikingly similar to those served by the first amendment. In per-
sonal behavior as well as in ideas, protection of individual choices
preserves dissent from the tastes of the majority.70
David Richards poses the question: "What is the constitutionally
permissible content of the legal enforcement of morals?"71 His an-
swer invokes a liberal theory of human rights traced from Milton,
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, to Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls.
Richards asserts that underlying any concept of human rights are "two
crucial assumptions: first, that persons have the capacity to be auton-
omous in living their life; second, that persons are entitled, as per-
sons, to equal concern and respect in exercising their capacities for
living autonomously."7 2 He argues that "[c]ontemporary understand-
ing of the strategic importance to self-respect and personhood of sexual
autonomy requires that we . . .guarantee full liberty to enjoy and
express love."73 And he invokes Ronald Dworkin's "rights thesis"74
to translate these observations into principles of constitutional law:
"Under the constitutional order, certain human rights are elevated
into legally enforceable rights, so that if a law infringes on these
moral rights, the law is not valid."7 5 The rights thesis treats rights
as "trump cards that, by definition, outweigh utilitarian or quasi-utili-
tarian considerations and can legitimately only be weighed against
other rights":74
This principle explains and justifies the sense in which the con-
stitutional right to privacy is a right. The constitutional concept
expresses an underlying moral principle resting on the enhance-
ment of sexual autonomy, the self-determination of the role of
sexuality in one's life which protects the values foundational to
the concept of human rights, equal concern and respect for au-
tonomy. Accordingly, in the absence of countervailing moral ar-
gument, laws which determine how one will have sex and with
what consequences are constitutionally invalid.
77
70. Id. at 611-13.
71. Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 24, at 976.
72. Id. at 964.
73. Id. at 1001.
74. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-90 (1978).
75. Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 24, at 958.
76. Id. at 959.
77. Id. at 1006.
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Our "constitutional morality" acorporates these principles and,
by contrast to conventional morality, is subject to the metaethical con-
straints of moral reasoning. It follows that
not everything invoked by democratic majorities as justified by
"public morality" is, in fact, morally justified. From the moral
point of view, we must always assess such claims by whether they
can be sustained by the underlying structure of moral reason-
ing . . . . In this regard, constitutional morality is at one with
the moral point of view.78
b. Competing Interests. The Court and proponents of fundamen-
tal rights adjudication do not regard constitutional rights as absolute-
ly protected under every conceivable circumstance; they are defeas-
ible by strong legitimate governmental interests. Wellington and Perry
do not engage in the accommodation or balancing of interests, for
the conventional moral view on any particular issue already reflects
the balance of competing interests. By contrast, the rights theorists
directly address the legitimacy and strength of justifications for in-
terfering with fundamental rights. The two most prominent justifi-
cations are promoting public morality and protecting the institutions
of marriage and the family.
Tribe's only comment on promoting morality is that "no uncon-
ventional form of consensual human sexuality can be excluded from
the protected sphere solely on the ground that it is thought by the
majority not to draw on the historically deepest wellsprings of hu-
man emotions and instincts." 79 Although he assumes that the state
may legitimately seek to protect and strengthen marriages, he doubts
that this interest suffices to sustain most regulations of sexual conduct8 0
78. Id. at 977. In discussing Rawls's concept of a "reflective equilibrium," Dworkin
emphasizes that where a particular intuition conflicts with general principles to which
one adheres, one must act on principle and not ignore the contradiction in the faith
that a more sophisticated set of principles will eventually be discovered that will recon-
cile the conflict. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 159-68.
79. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 947.
80. Id. at 946. Tribe is unusually sensitive to the potential threat that fundamental
rights adjudication poses to intermediate forms of association:
[T]he stereotypical "family unit" that is so much a part of our constitutional rhetoric
is becoming decreasingly central to our constitutional reality. Such "exercises of fa-
milial rights and responsibilities" as remain prove to be individual powers to resist
governmental determination of who shall be born, with whom one shall live, and
what values shall be transmitted.
This shift might well represent an irresistible corollary of changes in the structure
of American family life and social and cultural existence. Whatever its cause, the
issue it raises most sharply is the recurring puzzle of liberal individualism: Once the
State, whether acting through its courts or otherwise, has "liberated" the child-and
the adult-from the shackles of such intermediate groups as family, what is to defend
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Karst writes that, although freedom of intimate association "does
not imply that the state is wholly disabled from promoting majori-
tarian views of morality,""' the state may not invoke this legitimate
objective as an excuse to "prevent the expression of a particular idea,
or ... some harm that it fears will flow from the expressive aspects
of the conduct .... ,"2 Karst suggests that most laws regulating inti-
mate association are impermissibly concerned "to regulate the con-
tent of messages about sexual preference."8' 3 He also implies that the
state has no significant interest in protecting the family beyond the
wishes of its members.
Wilkinson and White find the general promotion of morality a
weak justification for regulating lifestyles:
The privilege of living in a free and open society entails . . .
some obligation to tolerate ideas and moral choices with which
one disagrees . . . . Moreover, to uphold legal proscriptions on
grounds of abstract morality would permit the state to ferret
out and ultimately to try and punish offenders upon the asser-
tion, not that the given behavior was socially harmful, but that
it was revolting and unnatural. Such a rule of law would invite
the majority to act upon its least noble and most prejudiced
impulses.84
On the other hand, they urge that
[family life has been a central unifying experience throughout
American society. Preserving the strength of this basic, organic
unit is a central and legitimate end of the police power. The
state ought to be concerned that if allegiance to traditional family
arrangements declines, society as a whole may well suffer.8 5
The state's "proper concern derives from the basic functions per-
formed by 'family' units in society: from sexual fulfillment and re-
production, to education and rearing of the young, to economic sup-
port and emotional security."8
the individual against the combined tyranny of the state and her own alienation?
Id. at 987-88 (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 892 (need for flexibility in defining
fundamental rights of personhood).
81. Karst, supra note 22, at 627.
82. Id. at 657.
83. Id. at 658 (referring to anti-homosexual legislation). See also id. at 672-73 (incest
and cohabitation).
84. Wilkinson & White, supra note 23, at 618 (footnote omitted). But see id. at 568
("Law is a vehicle by which democratic majorities reaffirm shared moral aspirations and
summon society's allegiance to a common set of behavioral goals.')
85. Id. at 595. See also id. at 569 (marriage as "a cornerstone of American society').
86. Id. at 623.
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Richards believes that there is "n. constitutional objection to pro-
hibiting clearly immoral acts that threaten the existence of society. 's7
But enforcing mere conventional morality "is incompatible with the
moral theory of human rights implicit in the constitutional order."' ,
For the same reason, Richards believes that the state may not require
conformity to any particular notion of the family unit. 9
c. Applications. All of the rights theorists find Griswold and Ei-
senstadt easy cases, and they ultimately approve of Roe v. Wade. Their
treatment of laws punishing homosexual conduct illuminates some
differences in their approaches.
Tribe believes that private consensual homosexual conduct should
be protected because it "is central to the personal identities of those
singled out by the state's law." 90 He concedes that the "history of
homosexuality has been largely a history of disapproval and disgrace."
However,
it makes all the difference in the world what level of generality
one employs to test the pedigree of an asserted liberty claim ....
It is crucial, in asking whether an alleged right forms part of a
traditional liberty, to define the liberty at a high enough level
of generality to permit unconventional variants to claim pro-
tection along with mainstream versions of protected conduct ....
[T]he tradition of respecting the intimate noncoercive sexual ac-
tions of others.., provides an umbrella capacious enough to sub-
sume homosexual as well as heterosexual variants.91
For Karst, "[a]ll of the values of intimate association are potentially
involved in homosexual relationships .... "92 "[A]ny effort by the
state to forbid intimate homosexual association must be justified by
the same sort of heroic state interests that would be necessary to jus-
tify forbidding heterosexual marriage or other forms of heterosexual
association." 93 Indeed, "the freedom of intimate association demands
some important justification for the state's offering the marital status
to heterosexuals and denying any comparable status to homosexuals." 94
87. Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 24, at 991.
88. Id. at 992.
89. Id. at 993-96.
90. L. TRBE, supra note 21, at 943.
91. Id. at 944-46.
92. Karst, supra note 22, at 682.
93. Id. at 685. Karst suggests that a state could justify laws penalizing homosexual
conduct only by showing that it caused noticeable damage; for example, "that a lesbian
mother ... was unfit to have custody of her child," or that a "male homosexual teacher
* . . created special risk of seduction of children assigned to his classes." Id. at 685.
94. Id. at 684.
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Wilkinson and White are troubled by the punishment of homo-
sexual conduct, because the "autonomy right to freely engage in sex
combines with a seclusion right not to be disturbed in the private
practice of'intimate sex to produce a constitutional lifestyle claim of
some power." 95 Nonetheless, "state interests of significant strength
support a prohibition of homosexuality."98 Of these, the most sig-
nificant is protecting the family by preventing homosexuality from
becoming a viable alternative to heterosexual intimacy. 7 The au-
thors disagree about the ultimate resolution:
Mr. Wilkinson would uphold the state's interest in the preser-
vation of the traditional family; Mr. White would desire stronger
empirical proof that the state interest is truly put in jeopardy by
homosexual practices among consenting adults. Both authors
acknowledge the intuitive elements in their judgments.98
Richards argues that homosexual conduct is not immoral 99 and
doubts that its legalization would have any significant effect on nor-
mal family life.100 "In any event," he concludes, "it is difficult to un-
derstand how the state has the right, on moral grounds, to protect
heterosexual love at the expense of homosexual love. Equal concern
and respect for autonomous choice seem precisely to forbid the kind
of calculation that this sort of sacrifice contemplates." 10'
The rights theorists invoke many of the same sources of values that
the consensus theorists employ to ascertain conventional morality. A
consensus theorist, however, is more immediately constrained by con-
ventional morality. If Wellington's Court determines that conven-
tional morality permits the punishment of homosexual conduct, it
must uphold the legislation. A rights theorist looks to conventional
morality as a nonexclusive guide to defining the breadth and con-
tours of higher level moral principles. Once articulated, these prin-
95. Wilkinson & White, supra note 23, at 593.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 595.
98. Id. at 596.
99. Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 24, at 981.89.
100. Id. at 994.95. Richards adds that "there is reason to believe that the argument
for protecting marriage and the family is hypocritically proposed. If the argument were
meant seriously, state laws against fornication and adultery would be vigorously pressed
in addition to the anti.homosexuality laws." Id. at 996.
101. Id. at 996.
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ciples operate independently of particular conventional views and
may even invalidate laws that are supported by a strong contrary
consensus. 102 Although Perry characterizes himself as a conventional
moralist, his willingness to hold society to its relatively abstract con-
ventional "ideals" aligns him more with the rights theorists than with
Wellington.
B. The Critics
In Democracy and Distrust,103 John Hart Ely criticizes seven pos-
sible approaches to fundamental rights adjudication: the judge's own
values, neutral principles, predicting progress, natural law, reason,
consensus, and tradition.104 Because no contemporary proponent of
fundamental rights adjudication relies on the first three approaches, 1 5
I restrict my comments to Ely's discussions of natural law and rea-
son, directed mainly against the rights theorists, and his critiques of
theories based on consensus and tradition. I then consider two other
criticisms of fundamental rights adjudication: Robert Bork's argu-
ment that the choice of the level of abstraction on which to discern
rights is inherently arbitrary, and Raoul Berger's claim that funda-
mental rights adjudication is prohibited by the text and original un-
derstanding of the Constitution.
1. The Critique of Rights Theories
Ely's critique of rights theories begins with two historical points.
He disputes the claim, made by some proponents, that fundamental
rights adjudication is heir to a natural law tradition that has been
virtually unbroken since the eighteenth century;10 6 and he shows
102. See, e.g., p. 1073 supra.
103. J. ELY, supra note 7.
104. Id. at 43-72.
105. Ely argues againt the view that the judge "should use his or her own values to
measure the judgment of the political branches." Id. at 44. Although this position is
"seldom endorsed in so many words," he suggests that the application of supposedly ob-
jective methodologies often comes down to the imposition of the judge's own values.
Ely also argues that the concept of neutral principles, proposed by Herbert Wechsler
as a constraint on all modes of constitutional decisionmaking, does "not provide a source
of substantive content." Id. at 55.
Finally, in The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, Alexander Bickel suggested
that the Warren Court had tried, and failed, to decide cases according to values it
believed would be accepted in the future. See A. BicKEL, supra note 18. Ely suggests
that "there was a good deal of prescription folded into Bickel's description," and com-
ments that the Court is incompetent to predict the future and that there is no justi-
fication for "[c]ontrolling today's generation by the values of its grandchildren." J. ELY,
supra note 7, at 69-70.
106. See, e.g., Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 20, at 695-700.
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how natural law "has been sumwoned in support of all manner of
causes in this country-some worthy, others nefarious-and often on
both sides of the same issue."' 0 7 Ely's main argument, however, is a
metaethical one: Natural law does not exist in a form that is useful for
resolving constitutional disputes:
"[A]ll the many attempts to build a moral and political doctrine
upon the conception of a universal human nature have failed.
Either the allegedly universal ends are too few and abstract to
give content to the idea of the good, or they are too numerous
and concrete to be truly universal. One has to choose between
triviality and implausibility . .." [O]ur society does not, rightly
does not, accept the notion of a discoverable and objectively valid
set of moral principles.108
Although few contemporary fundamental rights theorists invoke
"natural law" as such, some have suggested that judges seek values in
"the writings of good contemporary moral philosophers." 109 Ely re-
sponds:
Some moral philosophers think utilitarianism is the answer; others
feel just as strongly it is not. Some regard enforced economic redis-
tribution as a moral imperative; others find it morally censurable.
What may be the two most renowned recent works of moral and
political philosophy, John Rawls's A Theory of Jutice and Robert
Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia, reach very different con-
clusions."10
And he sardonically proposes a Supreme Court opinion that reads:
"We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win six to three. Statute in-
validated.""'
Although he denies the existence of absolute ethical truths, Ely
believes that "we can reason about moral issues ... [by proceeding]
from ethical principles or conclusions it is felt the reader is likely al-
ready to accept to other conclusions or principles he or she might not
previously have perceived as related in the way the writer suggests." 2
But he disputes the claim that "moral judgments are sounder if made
dispassionately, and that because of their comparative insulation judges
are more likely so to make them."'18
107. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 50.
108. Id. at 51-54 (quoting R. UNGE, KsowLDcz AN PoLrmcs 241 (1975)).
109. Id. at 58.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 54.
113. Id. at 57.
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First, he doubts the "alleged in-ompatibility between popular in-
put on moral questions and 'correct' moral judgment."'114 On the
contrary, "our moral sensors function best under the pressure of ex-
perience. Most of us did not fully wake up to the immorality of our
most recent war until we were shown pictures of Vietnamese children
being scalded by American napalm." 1 5
I find this argument unpersuasive. Granting that a moral judgment
is sounder when informed by experience, it also seems more secure
after we assimilate the events-after we recollect them in tranquillity
-than in their very midst. In any case, Ely's example is not equivalent
to the experience of either legislatures or courts. If, however, his point
is that our moral sensors respond better to the plights of actual individu-
als than to abstractions, why are legislators, prescribing the conduct of
anonymous people, better situated than courts hearing actual cases?"",
Second, Ely argues that judicial reasoning results in a "systematic
bias in ... [the] choice of fundamental values, unsurprisingly in fa-
vor of the values of the upper-middle, professional class," which con-
stitutes the "reasoning class":" 7
Thus, the list of values the Court and the commentators have
tended to enshrine as fundamental . .. [includes] expression, as-
sociation, education, academic freedom, the privacy of the home,
personal autonomy . . . . But watch most fundamental-rights
theorists start edging toward the door when someone mentions
jobs, food, or housing: those are important, sure, but they aren't
fundamental."18
This may overstate the case against some scholarly proponents of fun-
damental rights adjudication," 9 but it accurately describes others 20
and, more important, perhaps fits the Court itself.' 2 '
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Bickel argued that, while legislatures typically address "abstract or dimly fore-
seen problems ... . courts are concerned with the flesh and blood of an actual case.
This tends to modify, perhaps to lengthen, everyone's view. It also provides an ex-
tremely salutory proving ground for all abstractions ..... A. BicKmr, supra note 10, at 26.
117. J. Er, supra note 7, at 59 & n.**.
118. Id. at 59.
119. See D. Ricismns, supra note 24, at 135-91; L. TRmE, supra note 21, at 1116-36;
Karst, supra note 66, at 59-64 (1977). But see Tushnet, Dia-Tribe (Book Review), 78
Micn. L. Rav. 694 (1980) (criticizing Tribe for not acknowledging socialist implications
of constitutional theory). The seminal argument for the constitutional guarantee of ma-
terial security is Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 H~Av. L. REv. 7 (1969).
120. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 23.
121. See Tushnet, ".... And Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice"-some Notes on the
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2. The Critique of Consensus- a~zd Tradition-Based Theories
Ely writes that the "idea that society's 'widely shared values' should
give content to the Constitution's open-ended provisions . . . turns
out to be at the core of most 'fundamental values' positions. " 122
Certainly it is at the core of Wellington's and Perry's and plays a
role in most rights theories as well.
Ely doubts that American society shares a conventional morality,1"2 3
and argues that even if it did, the consensus is "not reliably discov-
erable, at least not by courts":1 24
"The more concrete the allusions to this allegedly timeless moral
agreement, the less convincing they become. Therefore, to make
their case the proponents of objective value must restrict them-
selves to a few abstract ideals whose vagueness allows almost any
interpretation . . ." [B]y viewing society's values through one's
own spectacles ... one can convince oneself that some invocable
consensus supports almost any position a civilized person might
want to see supported. 125
Ely makes a similar point about the indeterminacy and manipu-
lability of tradition, which "can be invoked in support of almost any
cause. '1 26 He cites the competing American traditions regarding both
malign and benign racial discrimination and quotes Garry Wills's
pithy remark that "Running men out of town on a rail is at least
as much an American tradition as declaring unalienable rights." 127
Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. Rzv. 177 (arguing that the Supreme Court
favors the well-off). Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state may not punish
abortion) with Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state need not fund nontherapeutic
abortions for the poor) and Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980) (state need not fund
therapeutic abortions for the poor).
122. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 63 (footnote omitted).
123. Id. at 63, 64.
124. Id. at 64.
125. Id. at 65-67 (quoting R. UNGER, supra note 108, at 78). Ely specifically finds un-
persuasive Wellington's analysis of abortions to protect the mother's physical and mental
health, see pp. 1070-71 supra, and cites public opinion polls that contradict the asserted
distinction. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 66 & 218 n.112.
126. Id. at 60.
127. Id. He also comments that the "overtly backward-looking character [of tradi-
tion] highlights its undemocratic nature: it is hard to square with the theory of our
government the proposition that yesterday's majority .. . should control today's." Id.
at 62. That does not seem responsive to the role that tradition plays in most fun-
damental rights theories, where it is seldom if ever employed as an independent, or
even as the primary, basis for decision, but rather as ancillary support for the existence
and stability of a putative present consensus. See Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MicK. L. REv. 981, 103741 (1979); Tushnet, The Newer
Property: Suggestions for a Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261.
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3. The Levels-of-Abstraction Problem and the
Balancing of Competing Interests
Ely underscores his argument against tradition as a source for
constitutional values by noting the "understandable temptation to
vary the relevant tradition's level of abstraction to make it come out
right."12 18 The levels-of-abstraction problem is pervasive, infecting
theories of adjudication based on rights and consensus as well as
tradition.
For example, Professor Bork criticizes Griswold on the ground that
the Court's choice of the level on which to define the protected lib-
erty was necessarily arbitrary. He notes that the Court surely did
not adopt the very broad principle that "government may not in-
terfere with any acts done in private."129 On the other hand, for
the Court to define the principle narrowly--"government may not
prohibit the use of contraceptives by married couples"-presents prob-
lems of "neutral definition":130
Why does the principle extend only to married couples? Why, out
of all forms of sexual behavior, only to the use of contraceptives?
Why, out of all forms of behavior, only to sex? ' .
To put the matter another way, if a neutral judge must dem-
onstrate why principle X applies to cases A and B but not to
case C . . ., he must, by the same token, also explain why the
principle is defined as X, rather than as X minus, which would
cover A but not cases B and C, or as X plus, which would cover
all cases, A, B, and C.131
This is a powerful criticism. For example, does Judith Thomson's
tale of the violinist 3 2 establish an absolute right to terminate all
nonconsensual life-supporting dependencies under all conceivable cir-
cumstances? Or does the right depend on the unwilling benefactor's
particular relationship to the beneficiary (e.g., strangers, mother-child)
and on the severity of the imposition? Does Karst's and Richards's
principle of equal respect protect all consensual sexual activity or only
sex within a loving intimate association?133 Why does Wilkinson's
128. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 61; see id. at 215 n.86 (quoting Tribe's discussion of
homosexuality, see p. 1078 supra).
129. Bork, supra note 27, at 7.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 7.
132. See p. 1070 supra.
133. Karst would protect casual sexual relationships because, among other things,
"they may ripen into durable intimate associations." Karst, supra note 22, at 633.
1084
Vol. 90: 1063, 1981
Fundamental Rights
and White's theory extend protection to some lifestyle choices but
not others?184
The indeterminacy and manipulability of levels of generality is
closely related, if not ultimately identical, to the arbitrariness inherent
in accommodating fundamental rights with competing government
interests. For example, rights theorists must not only speculate about
the long-range social consequences of granting various sexual and
associational freedoms, but must choose how much weight to accord
asserted state interests such as protecting the traditional family unit.
As Wilkinson and White acknowledge, these judgments are essen-
tially intuitive.185
4. The Ghost of Lochner and The Court's Substantive Record
For critics and proponents alike, Lochner v. New York 36 sym-
bolizes the dark side of fundamental rights adjudication. Wellington
concedes that the language of the Constitution does not justify "a
different scope of review.., of legislation restricting personal or civil
as distinguished from economic liberties";137 nor does Justice Stone's
Carolene Products footnote.138 And the notion that "personal liber-
ties are more important, and in that sense more fundamental, than
economic liberties" is simply elitist.139 Rather, Wellington asserts,
the Court's equation of laissez faire economics with personal liberty
did not reflect the conventional morality.1 40 Perry shares this view,141
as does Tribe, who writes that if Lochner was wrong,
the reason can only be that, in twentieth century America, mini-
mum wage laws, as a substantive matter, are not intrusions upon
human freedom in any meaningful sense, but are instead entirely
reasonable and just ways of attempting to combat economic sub-
jugation and human domination.... What was wrong was simply
that, as a picture of freedom in industrial society, the one painted
by the Justices badly distorted the character and needs of the
human condition and the reality of the economic situation. . . .
[But] there is no escape from the difficult task of painting a
better-a morally and economically truer-picture .... 142
134. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 23, at 614-17 (limits on lifestyle rights);
note 68 supra (same).
135. See p. 1079 supra.
136. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
137. Wellington, supra note 19, at 277 (footnote omitted).
138. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
139. Wellington, supra note 19, at 279.
140. Id. at 282-83.
141. Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 20, at 702-04.
142. L. Tamz, supra note 21, at 453, 455 n.37.
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For John Ely, Lochner illustrates te Court's intrinsic perceptual limi-
tations:
It may be ... that the "right to an abortion," or noneconomic
rights generally, accord more closely with "this generation's ide-
alization of America" than the "rights" asserted in . . . Lochner
... .But that attitude, of course, is precisely the point of the
Lochner philosophy, which would grant unusual protection to
those "rights" that somehow seem most pressing, regardless of
whether the Constitution suggests any special solicitude for
them. 43
Lochner is so evocative because we think the Court enforced the
wrong values. (It is difficult to imagine Griswold playing the same
symbolic role.) Implicit in Ely's charge of "Lochnering" 144 is the
claim that "the closer the Court has come to overt fundamental-values
reasoning the less impressively it has performed.' 45 To pursue this
critique would require reference to criteria-which Ely and Bork deny
exist146-for determining the correctness of judicially enforced values.
Whether or not the Court's record can be evaluated, however,1 47
Lochner remains an embarrassment for proponents of fundamental
rights adjudication and cause for skepticism about the practice. Tribe
writes:
Part of what was wrong with Lochner was the Court's overcon-
fidence, both in its own factual notions about working condi-
tions and perhaps also in its own normative convictions about
the meaning of liberty; at least by the 1920's, if not yet in 1905,
the Court should probably have paid more heed to the mounting
agreement, if not the consensus, that the economic "freedom" it
was protecting was more myth than reality.
48
But if, in retrospect, the Lochner Court was overconfident about its
notion of economic liberty in the face of, a mounting agreement to
143. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
939 (1973) (footnote omitted).
144. Id. at 944.
145. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 213 n.66.
146. See pp. 1081, 1085 supra.
147. One scholar's recent attempt to assess the "record of judicial review" simply
relies on the reader's intuitions of what constitute "advances" and "retreats." See J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 79-122 (1980). For an
earlier review of the Court's work, see Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy, 19
VA. Q. REv. 417 (1943).
148. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 454.
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the contrary, how should the proponents' Court respond to the ap-
parent ascendency of a "moral majority"?
5. The Text and Original Understanding
Fundamental rights adjudication is open to the criticisms that it is
not authorized and not guided by the text and original history of
the Constitution. Among the critics, only Raoul Berger rests his case
exclusively on the lack of authorization. Explaining the scope of his
argument, Berger writes:
Nor will I deal with whether or not judicial review is antidemo-
critarian, for if judicial review of the Warrenite scope was "au-
thorized" by the Constitution, its antidemocratic nature has con-
stitutional sanction.... What is of paramount importance...
is that the Court "is under obligation to trace its premises to the
charter from which it derives its authority . . . ." [T]he "sub-jectivity" involved in making value choices plays no role in my
view of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ....149
Berger's condemnation of fundamental rights adjudication is inci-
dental to an attack on virtually every significant decision under
the Fourteenth Amendment-including Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion25 --as inconsistent with the adopters' limited intent to incorporate
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the Constitution. The academic
response to Berger has focused on his analysis of the equal protection
clause, arguing that it is methodologically and factually problem-
atic.15' If the Court's race decisions are deeply rooted in the text
and original history of the Constitution, however, fundamental rights
adjudication seems less secure. Indeed, the proponents' originalist
claims tend to be perfunctory at best. 52
149. R. BmtoEz, supra note 26, at 284-85 (quoting Ely, supra note 143, at 949) (footnotes
omitted).
150. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
151. See, e.g., Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History
(Book Review), 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979). See generally Symposium, 6 HASTINGS CONsr.
L.Q. 403 (1979) (symposium on Raoul Berger's theory of the Fourteenth Amendment);
cf. Brest, supra note 6 (discussing problems of originalist constitutional interpretation).
152. For example, though Wellington writes that "the power of judicial review can
be exercised only when the principle the Court employs is related to constitutional text,"
Wellington, supra note 19, at 267, he never discloses the textual basis for his consensus
theory. Richards also implies that fundamental rights adjudication is grounded in the
text of the Constitution, but does not specify its textual basis. Richards, Sexual Autonomy,
supra note 24, at 963-64. The proponents' claims of authority from the original under-
standing tend to be conclusory and oblique. For example, Perry writes:
The Founding Fathers and, "perhaps by emulation," those who were responsible
for the fourteenth amendment, intended that the specific content of the vague,
ethical norms of the Constitution, including due process, remain to some extent an
open question to be answered by each generation, for each generation .... [I]t
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Ironically, Ely is quite ready tn acknowledge the originalist cre-
dentials of fundamental rights adjudication:
[T]he most plausible interpretation of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause is, as it must be, the one suggested by its language-
that it was a delegation to future constitutional decision-makers
to protect certain rights that the document neither lists, at least
not exhaustively, nor even in any specific way gives directions
for finding.1 53
. .. [T]he Ninth Amendment was intended to signal the ex-
istence of federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically
enumerated in the Constitution .... 114
For Ely, however, this is "[not] a question on which history can
have the last word": 155
If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of the Consti-
tution's open-ended provisions cannot be developed, one that is
not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to rep-
resentative democracy, responsible commentators must consider
seriously the possibility that courts simply should stay away from
them.158
Bork likewise is concerned with the absence of guidance. From the
premise that all values are intrinsically subjective, he concludes:
Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value
to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed
human value to any other. The judge must stick close to the text
and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct
new rights.1 57
This, then, is the controversy over the sources of fundamental rights
and the methods for ascertaining them. The critics are, of course, right
simply will not do to suggest that those who choose to maintain and apply the
[public welfare] limit... are acting without any constitutional basis.... mhe idea
that due process imposes a public welfare limit on the police power is a recurrent,
basic theme of American constitutional theory, and one with eminently respectable
credentials.
Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 20, at 706-07 (footnotes omitted). See also L. TiuB,
supra note 21, at 569-72 (Constitution guarantees rights not specified in text); Richards,
Sexual Autonomy, supra note 24, at 960 (same).
153. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 28; cf. id. at 14 (Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments
invite non. textually-based decisionmaking).
154. Id. at 38.
155. Id. at 41.
156. Id.
157. Bork, supra note 26, at 8.
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that fundamental rights adjudication is not guided by the text or
original history of the Constitution. The interesting question is wheth-
er the Court has access to other defensible sources of values.
Even assuming that general principles can be found in social con-
sensus or derived by moral reasoning, the application of those prin-
ciples is highly indeterminate and subject to manipulation. The point
is partly illustrated by disagreements among theorists employing es-
sentially the same methodology: Wilkinson would uphold sodomy
laws, while White, Karst, Tribe, and Richards would strike them
down; both Wilkinson and White would uphold adultery laws,158
while Tribe finds them constitutionally doubtful.159 Even when the
scholars are in substantial agreement, however, their conclusions are
not obviously determined by their sources and methods. And, ironi-
cally, the more sensitive a judge is to the complexities of the social
values at stake, the greater the indeterminacy, the scope of discre-
tion, and opportunity for manipulation.16 0
III. The Critics Against Themselves
The critics are not merely critics. They have their own theories,
which encompass a range of alternatives to fundamental rights ad-
judication: Raoul Berger and Robert Bork are both originalists-the
former a "strict intentionalist," the latter a constrained "moderate
originalist." 161 John Ely proposes a substantially nonoriginalist ap-
proach to judicial review, limited to the purpose of ensuring the in-
tegrity and representativeness of the legislative process.
I shall argue that none of the critics' affirmative theories can with-
stand the force of his own criticisms. This casts a somewhat different
light on the conclusions of the preceding section and begins to il-
158. See Wilkinson & White, sup-a note 23, at 599.
159. See L. TimE, supra note 21, at 946.
160. Consider, for example, the difficulties of heeding Tribe's caution that
a court must decide, in this society and at this time, whether a person's choice to
act or think in a certain way should be fundamentally protected against coercion
by law, recognizing that the alternative in some situations may be coercion by
economic or peer pressure and, in others, more meaningfully undominated choice.
And to add to the difficulty of the task: neither judges nor legislators nor citizens
should permit decisions of this kind, focused as each must be upon its precise
context, to be taken without attention to the drift of their cumulative result. Those
charged with the responsibility of choice must avoid too myopic an adherence to
the matter at hand, recognizing that the ultimate results of incremental change
might be wholly alien, and perhaps profoundly objectionable, to those who ac-
quiesce step by step.
Id. at 892.
161. See Brest, supra note 6, at 222-24 (defining these terms).
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luminate the contradictions inher ,nt in the fundamental rights con-
troversy.
A. Raoul Berger's Strict Intentionalism
For Berger, the only relevant question is how the adopters of the
Fourteenth Amendment would have decided a particular case had
it arisen in 1868.162 He is not concerned with their interpretive ir.-
tentions (the canons of construction by which they intended their
provisions to be interpreted) or with the level of abstraction on which
they intended their provisions to be read-for example, whether they
intended only to establish general principles or, at the other extreme,
to bind future interpreters to their particular views on each issue
that might arise under the provision. e3
Berger's indifference to interpretive intent and the intended level
of abstraction undermines the very premise of his theory-the obli-
gation of fidelity to the adopters' intentions-by confusing their inten-
tions with their mere personal views.'6 There is no reason to sup-
pose that the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended its
provisions to be interpreted by Berger's strict intentionalist canons.
If they adverted to the matter at all, the adopters more likely intended
a textualist approach such as the "plain meaning rule."'165 Thus, fi-
delity to their intentions may require an interpreter to eschew de-
tailed inquiry into the adopters' particular views and look instead
to the text, perhaps understood in the light of their general purposes
in enacting the provision.066
In fact, we cannot determine the adopters' interpretive intent and
often cannot even discover their substantive views with much par-
ticularity. Like other formalist strategies, strict intentionalism pre-
tends to constrain constitutional decisionmaking while inviting, if
not demanding, arbitrary manipulation of sources and outcomes.
B. Robert Bork's Constrained Moderate Originalism
Robert Bork believes that all constitutional adjudication must pro-
ceed from the text and purposes of particular provisions, but his ap-
proach is more expansive than Berger's. For example, Bork approves
of Brown. He writes that, although the Court cannot ascertain the
162. R. BERGER, supra note 26, at 1-19.
163. See Brest, supra note 6, at 212, 215-17.
164. See id. at 220, 227 n.87.
165. See id. at 215-16.
166. See, e.g., p. 1091 infra.
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precise intentions of the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment,
there is
one thing the Court does know: it was intended to enforce the
core idea of black equality against government discrimination.
And the Court, because it must be neutral, cannot pick and
choose between competing gratifications and, likewise, cannot
write the detailed code the framers omitted, requiring equality
in this case but not in another. The Court must, for that reason,
choose a general principle of equality that applies to all cases. 167
Bork requires the Court to adopt a "general principle of equality,"
not because the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment
require it-they obviously don't-but to prevent the Justices from im-
posing their own value choices. The very adoption of such a prin-
ciple, however, demands an arbitrary choice among levels of abstrac
tion. Just what is "the general principle of equality that applies to all
cases"? Is it the "core idea of black equality" that Bork finds in the
original understanding (in which case Alan Bakke did not state a
constitutionally cognizable claim),168 or a broader principle of "racial
equality" (so that, depending on the precise content of the principle,
Bakke might have a case after all), or is it a still broader principle
of equality that encompasses discrimination on the basis of gender
(or sexual orientation) as well?' 6 ' Why, as Bork asks in his discussion
of Griswold, X rather than X minus or X plus?17 °
Bork encounters the same difficulty in his attempt to limit the
protection of the First Amendment to "explicitly political speech"
rather than, say, "speech."' 7' The fact is that all adjudication requires
167. Bork, supra note 26, at 14-15.
168. Regents of University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). But see Bork, The
Unpersuasive Bakke Decision, Wall St. J., July 21,1978, at 8, cols. 3-6.
169. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
170. Curiously, although Bork wishes to adopt a per se equal protection standard to
assure neutrality of application, he prefers Justice Stewart's highly discretionary "sys-
tematic frustration of the will of a majority" standard in the reapportionment cases,
e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). to the Court's one-person-one-vote standard.
Bork, supra note 27, at 18-19. Compare M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME
CouRT 245-47 (1964) (Court should take account of realities of political contexts) with
Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. Rav. 169, 246-47 (1968) (political realities beyond
judiciary's institutional competence).
171. See Bork, supra note 27, at 20-35. He notes that the text and history of the
Amendment provide scant guidance, but finds a rationale implicit in the structure of
the Constitution: A representative democracy "would be meaningless without freedom
to discuss government and its policies." Id. at 23. He then considers Alexander Meiklejohn's
and Harry Kalven's view that this rationale extends to all "[f]orms of thought and ex-
pression within the range of human communications from which the voter derives the
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making choices among the levels of generality on which to articulate
principles, and all such choices are inherently non-neutral. No form
of constitutional decisionmaking can be salvaged if its legitimacy de-
pends on satisfying Bork's requirements that principles be "neutrally
derived, defined and applied."'172
C. Ely's "Participation-Oriented, Representation-
Reinforcing" Judicial Review
John Ely's theory of constitutional adjudication also aspires to ju-
dicial neutrality in the choice and application of values. Although
Ely claims originalist support for his theory, it is essentially uncon-
strained by the text and original understanding. His theory builds
on Justice Stone's suggestion, in footnote 4 of Carolene Products,73
that the judiciary should actively scrutinize legislation (1) "which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" or (2) which is based
on "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities." Ely's thesis is that,
unlike an approach geared to the judicial imposition of "fun-
damental values," the representation-reinforcing orientation . . .
is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary is entirely suppor-
knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity for sane and objective
judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express." Id. at 26 (quoting Meikle-
john, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255). Bork rejects
Kalven's "invitation to follow a dialectic progression from public official to government
policy to public policy to matters in the public domain":
I agree that there is an analogy between criticism of official behavior and the pub-
lication of a novel like Ulysses, for the latter may form attitudes that ultimately
affect politics. But it is an analogy, not an identity. Other human activities and
experiences also form personality, teach and create attitudes just as much as does
the novel .... If the dialectical progression is not to become an analogical stampede,
the protection of the first amendment must be cut off when it reaches the outer limits
of political speech.
Id. at 27. Bork therefore would draw the line at "explicitly political speech." But if
there exist plausible alternative theories of free expression, or alternative applications
of his theory, then his criterion fails his own test of neutrality. Professor Scanlon offers
an alternative theory premised on a notion of individual autonomy that treats each person
as sovereign in deciding what to believe. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression,
1 PHiLOSOPHY & PuB. AFF. 204 (1972). Dean Wellington argues that only a nonconse-
quentialist theory of this sort can be neutrally applied. 'Wellington, On Freedom of
Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1120-21 (1979). Even if one adopts Bork's instrumental
rationale, however, there are alternative standards no less neutral than "explicitly political
speech"-for example, just plain "speech."
172. Bork, supra note 27, at 23.
173. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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tive of, the American system of representative democracy. It . . .
[is devoted] to policing the mechanisms by which the system seeks
to ensure that our elected representatives will actually represent.174
Ely approves of the Court's reapportionment and other voting-rights
decisions; he urges the broad protection of political expression; and
he argues for vigorous scrutiny of classifications that disadvantage po-
litically powerless minorities.
Ely's theory of suspect classifications, the book's most significant
affirmative contribution, is vulnerable to the same criticisms that he
finds fatal to fundamental rights adjudication-vulnerable precisely
because it turns out to be a fundamental rights theory, albeit some-
what disguised. 75
Under Ely's theory, essentially any law disadvantaging a discrete
and insular minority that is the object of prejudice is "suspect" and
therefore invalid unless it closely "fits" legitimate governmental ob-
jectives.170 This strict scrutiny is justified by two features of preju-
dice: (1) prejudice is intrinsically wrong-"[t]o disadvantage a group
essentially out of dislike is surely to deny its members equal concern
and respect"; 177 and (2) prejudice distorts legislators' assessments of
the costs and benefits of proposed decisions because it induces them
to overestimate both the validity of stereotypes disfavoring minorities
and the costs of more individualized treatment. 78 Ely asserts that ju-
dicial intervention in these cases promotes "participation." He grudg-
ingly concedes that participation may be a value but claims that it
174. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 101-02. Curiously, he criticizes consensus theories, which
are also designed to remedy defects of representative process, on the ground that "it
makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for pro-
tecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority." Id. at 69.
175. Note that Ely's Court must make some value choices even apart from the suspect
classification theory, simply in order to protect electoral participation and freedom of
expression. For example, it must decide just how representative a government must be
and who should be included in the political community. Compare Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Douglas, J.) (striking down poll tax) with id. at
686 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court must also balance representation-reinforcing in-
terests against competing social interests, such as preventing riots and espionage, and
ensuring that voters possess adequate maturity, loyalty, and interest in the outcome.
Compare, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invali-
dating statute restricting vote in school district elections to owners of taxable property
and parents of school children) with Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding apportionment of vote in public water district in
proportion to property ownership). These decisions require assessing the strength of the
competing interests, and it is not evident how a Court can do that without relying on
social consensus or fundamental values.
176. See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 145-48.
177. rd. at 157.
178. Id. at 155-57.
1093
The Yale Law Journal
is quite different from the substanL've values involved in the theories
he criticizes.179
Even assuming that participation is a privileged value, however, 180
Ely's theory still requires the court to make unprivileged value choic-
es.18 ' Ely asserts that a legislature may not disadvantage people mere-
ly because it dislikes them. This sounds like fundamental rights talk.
Certainly, a hard-core utilitarian could not distinguish gratifying th.
majority's hostile (or altruistic) desires from gratifying their aesthetic,
moral, or any other kinds of desires. 8 2 Ely's equal protection theory
would collapse, however, if gratifying the majority's dislike for a ra-
cial minority were treated as legitimate. At the same time, Ely wishes
to permit the legislature to act hostilely toward groups such as bur-
glars. 8 3 To maintain this distinction. Ely argues that, although grati-
fying the majority's dislike is not a legitimate goal, satisfying its moral
beliefs is perfectly permissible.
This is where things get tricky. For example, Ely believes that laws
disadvantaging homosexuals are suspect because homosexuals are the
objects of widespread prejudice.8 4 But he would permit a legislature
to punish homosexual conduct "due to a bona fide feeling that it is
immoral": 85
This doesn't mean that simply by incanting "immorality" a state
can be permitted successfully to defend a law that in fact was moti-
vated by a desire simply to injure a disfavored group of persons.
179.
If the objection is . . . that one might well "value" certain decision procedures
for their own sake, of course it is right: one might. And to one who insisted on
that terminology, my point would be that the "values" the Court should pursue are
"participational values" of the sort I have mentioned, since those are the "values"
(1) with which our Constitution has preeminently and most successfully concerned
itself, (2) whose "imposition" is not incompatible with, but on the contrary supports,
the American system of representative democracy, and (3) that courts set apart from
the political process are uniquely suited to "impose."
Id. at 75 n.* See also pp. 1102-04 infra (constrained utilitarian argument for repre-
sentation-reinforcing judicial review).
180. I am not persuaded by the arguments quoted in the preceding footnote. The
claim that the Constitution is preeminently concerned with participational values is based
on a selective and idiosyncratic reading of the document. See Lynch, Book Review, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 859-62 (1980). In any case, participation is only half the story of
democracy, the other half being the protection of individual rights. See pp. 1096-1105
infra.
181. For a more detailed discussion of some of the points that follow, see Brest,
supra note 8.
182. Indeed, Ely criticizes Dworkin for excluding "external preferences" from his utili-
tarian calculus. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND.
L.J. 399, 407 & n.32 (1978).
183. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 154.
184. Id. at 163.
185. Id. at 256 n.92.
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. .. The question... reduces to whether the claim is credible that
the prohibition in question was generated by a sincerely held
moral objection to the act (or anything else that transcends a
simple desire to injure the parties involved). 86
Ely forgets that racial segregation and antimiscegenation laws, as
well as stereotypical gender classifications, have often been based-per-
haps often sincerely-on the supposed immorality of racial intermin-
gling and intermarriage, or of women not fulfilling their missions as
mothers and wives. In short, a "conscientious objection" exception for
discrimination based on our moral beliefs poses nearly the same threat
to Ely's theory as treating dislike and hostility as legitimate objectives.
The theory also presents methodological difficulties. When the gov-
ernment defends a law on moral grounds, the Court must determine
whether the belief is actually "moral" and, if so, how "sincerely" it
is held. Ely does not suggest how this can be done, and for good
reason: In his critique of fundamental rights adjudication he denies
that consensus exists on such questions and asserts that a court can
identify moral beliefs only by employing dubious "laundering de-
vices."18 7
Although the fundamental rights proponents' and critics' theories
of constitutional adjudication presented in this article are not ex-
haustive, they are broadly representative. The proponents span the
range of nonoriginalist adjudication; Berger and Bork typify the strate-
gies of strict and moderate originalism; and Ely's representation-rein-




Such techniques are evident in the work of consensus theorists generally, and are
sometimes made explicit. Ronald Dworkin argues that community values must be
refined by the judge in a way that removes prejudice, emotional reaction, ra-
tionalization, and "parroting," and in addition should be tested for sincerity and
consistency .... [Wellington writes that] courts "must be reasonably confident that
they draw on conventional morality and screen out contemporary bias, passion, and
prejudice, or indeed, that they distinguish cultivated taste from moral obligation."
Id. at 67 n.0 (citations omitted).
188. See, e.g., L. LusKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975); Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in
Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1049
(1979): Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1980); Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. Cr. REV. 95; Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HAXv. L. Rxv. 1 (1972); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269
(1975).
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My point so far is not that any c.F these theories are untenable, but
that all are vulnerable to similar criticisms based on their indeter-
minacy, manipulability, and, ultimately, their reliance on judicial
value choices that cannot be "objectively" derived from text, history,
consensus, natural rights, or any other source. No theory of constitu-
tional adjudication can defend itself against self-scrutiny. Each crit-
ic's assessment of the alternative theories seems rather like an aes
thetic judgment issued from the Warsaw Palace of Culture.8 9
At this point, a partisan of representative democracy might be
tempted to discard judicial review entirely, or retreat to the extra-
ordinarily permissive standards of the minimum rationality tests.19 0
The following section argues, however, that abandoning a rights-ori-
ented theory of judicial review is as problematic as any alternative.
IV. The Contradictions of Madisonian Democracy
In discussing what he terms the dilemma of Madisonian democra-
cy,19 ' Professor Bork brings us closer to the central issue of the fun-
damental rights controversy:
A Madisonian system is not completely democratic, if by "demo-
cratic" we mean completely majoritarian. It assumes that in wide
areas of life majorities are entitled to rule for no better reason
[than] that they are majorities.... The model also has a counter-
majoritarian premise, however, for it assumes that there are some
areas of life a majority should not control. There are some
things a majority should not do to us no matter how democrati-
cally it decides to do them. These are areas properly left to in-
dividual freedom, and coercion by the majority in these aspects
of life is tyranny.
Some see the model as containing an inherent, perhaps an in-
soluble, dilemma. Majority tyranny occurs if legislation invades
the areas properly left to individual freedom. Minority tyranny
occurs if the majority is prevented from ruling where its power
is legitimate. Yet, quite obviously, neither the majority nor mi-
nority can be trusted to define the freedom of the other.192
189. A (genuine) Polish joke goes: "Why is the best view of Warsaw from the Palace
of Culture?" "Because that's the only place in Warsaw where you can't see the Palace
of Culture."
190. See Bennett, supra note 188 (discussing rationality standards). This path is not
open to an originalist. See Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in
Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125 (1970).
191. See R. DAHL, A PREFcE To DEMOCRATiC TAEoRY (1956).
192. Bork, supra note 27, at 2-3.
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The parties to the fundamental rights controversy resolve the tension
between majority rule and minority rights in divergent ways. This
section argues that their resolutions are determined by the ways they
frame the issues in the first instance, and that the Madisonian dilemma
is in fact unresolvable.
Ely echoes Alexander Bickel's characterization of judicial review
as a "deviant institution in the American democracy," 193 while some
proponents treat the state's infringement of individual rights as at
least as deviant in a constitutional democracy. For example, David
Richards applauds the "intrinsically countermajoritarian" nature of
judicial review as an acknowledgment of "ideas of human rights that,
by definition, government has no moral title to transgress." 19 4
Their different premises explain why Ely and Richards reach op-
posite conclusions. But what underlies the premises themselves? Ely
and Bork profess to be Madisonian democrats, not populist majori-
tarians. Why, then, do they view judicial review as "deviant" rather
than as integral to the democratic order? And why do the proponents
ignore or give so little weight to majoritarian decisionmaking? Jesse
Choper's recent book, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process,95 makes transparent some recurring confusions about democ-
racy, and thus helps illuminate these questions.
Professor Choper's "major theme is that although judicial review is
incompatible with a fundamental precept of American democracy--
majority rule-the Court must exercise this power in order to protect
individual rights, which are not adequately represented in the political
processes."1 96 Initially, he equates democracy with pure majoritarian-
ism;'9 7 he asserts that "the federal judiciary... is the least democratic
of the three branches" 198 and that judicial review is "[n]ot merely anti-
majoritarian . . . [but] seems to cut directly against the grain of
traditional democratic philosophy."' 99 Choper then acknowledges a
Madisonian concept of democracy, which includes some restraints on
majority rule.20 0 One might hence argue that the Court "consti-
tutes 'a working part of the democratic political life of the nation'
because the power of judicial review has been historically exercised to
193. A. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 18; see J. ELY, supra note 7, at 4-5, 67.
194. Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 24, at 958.
195. J. CitoPE, supra note 147.
196. Id. at 2.
197. Id. at 5.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 6.
200. Id. at 6-7.
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restrain the majority from impinging on the constitutionally desig-
nated liberties of the individual, thus to assure those ultimate values
that are integral to democracy."2 0' Choper counters:
The difficulty with this position is that it commingles sub-
stance with procedure. The Supreme Court does advance demo-
cratic values by rejecting political action that threatens indi-
vidual liberty .... But irrespective of the content of its decisions,
the process of judicial review is not democratic because the
Court is not a politically responsible institution. . . . Although
the Supreme Court may play a vital role in the preservation of
the American democratic system, the procedure of judicial re-
view is in conflict with the fundamental principle of democracy
-majority rule under conditions of political freedom.20 2
Choper also rejects the "most sophisticated" argument, that "the so-
called political branches . . . are by no means as democratic as stan-
dard belief would hold and that the Court is much more subject to
the popular will than conventional wisdom would grant."203 All things
considered, "the Supreme Court is not as democratic as the Congress
or President, and the institution of judicial review is not as majori-
tarian as the lawmaking process." 204
A. The Choice Between a Systemic and a Particularistic
Perspective and Some Problems of the Second Best
Choper is pervasively ambiguous about whether the criterion of
"being democratic" is applicable to an entire political system or to
particular institutions within it. Although he suggests that judicial
review might promote democracy by protecting individual rights, he
continues to voice the concern that "the Court" and "judicial review"
are "the least democratic" of our political institutions. (It is as if,
having concluded that the Federal Reserve Bank contributes to the
overall efficiency of the economy, one continued to worry that the
Fed, as such, is "uneconomic.")
this vacillation between systemic and particularistic perspectives
responds to a fantasy most of us hold, that each isolated actor and
action within a complex social system will reflect the essence of the
201. Id. at 9 (quoting Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NOnE
DAME LAw. 573, 576 (1958).
202. Id. at 9-10.
203. Id. at 10.
204. Id. at 58. Choper goes on to argue that the Court should nonetheless review
"claimed violations of individual rights." Id. at 65.
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system-as each fragment of a hologram contains the entire image.
Phenomenologically, we find it difficult to grasp the whole and its
parts simultaneously; so we move back and forth between them, deny-
ing one as we embrace the other. And we maintain a strong norma-
tive skepticism about systemic justifications for acts that are troubling
when viewed in isolation. This is what makes the problems of "role-
differentiated behavior" 205 in professional ethics interesting and trou-
blesome. Choper seems to regard judicial review with the same am-
bivalence that we might view the successful defense of a guilty crim-
inal or the acquittal of an innocent defendant through perjured
testimony.
If these observations do not fully explain the confusing legal dis-
course about democracy, they at least provide a background against
which another, more specific, factor may operate-the psychological
and empirical difficulties we confront if we take seriously the politi-
cal analogue of the "second-best." In economics, the theory of the
second best holds that a regulatory scheme that is intrinsically inef-
ficient when viewed in isolation may actually contribute to the over-
all efficiency of an economy because of the way it interacts with ap-
parent inefficiencies elsewhere in the system. By analogy, as Martin
Shapiro has observed, 20 6 a nonmajoritarian institution may contrib-
ute to the democratic functioning of an imperfect system.
The very possibility of second best often seems counterintuitive,
however. The empirical uncertainty it engenders disturbs the intel-
lectual repose and formal order we crave. And as applied to judicial
review, it requires confronting the conceptual difficulties underly-
ing any definition of "democracy."
Constitutional scholars typically respond by acknowledging the com-
plexity of the issues and immediately offering their intuitive, com-
mon sense conclusion for or against judicial review. For example,
Ely writes:
Sophisticated commentary never tires of reminding us that leg-
islatures are only imperfectly democratic. Beyond the fact that
the appropriate answer is to make them more democratic, how-
ever, the point is one that may on analysis backfire. The existing
antimajoritarian influences in Congress and the state legislatures,
capable though they may be of blocking legislation, are not well
205. See Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS
L. Rzv. 1, 3 (1975).
206. M. Siiwmo, FREEDOM OF SPzECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5-45
(1966).
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situated to get legislation passed in the face of majority opposi-
tion. That makes all the more untenable the suggestion.., that
courts should invalidate legislation in the name of a supposed
contrary consensus. Beyond that, however, we may grant until
we're blue in the face that legislatures aren't wholly democratic,
but that isn't going to make courts more democratic than leg-
islatures.20T
Ely's point is that, because the Court can only strike down legisla-
tion, not enact it, substantive judicial review is not responsive to an-
timajoritarian defects in the legislative process. He qualifies the as-
sertion somewhat, but only in a note at the back of the book: "There
may of course exist situations in which a majority cannot pass a
law repealing old legislation because of minority resistance. But sure-
ly antiquity alone does not suggest the existence of a disapproving
majority . *... ,208 The tone and placement of the passage leave no
doubt about what Ely believes to be the main truth and what a minor
qualification of it. Yet he offers little to persuade the reader who
does not already share his intuition. The question, I suppose, is not
whether legislatures are generally representative, but how their pro-
cesses function on the particular kinds of issues that come before
courts in individual rights litigation.20 9
While the critics' analysis of the "countermajoritarian difficulty"
of judicial review seems incomplete, the proponents of fundamental
rights adjudication scarcely address the issue. Tribe adopts what
Choper and Ely label as the "sophisticated" position-that we have
"an imperfectly antidemocratic judicial process and an imperfectly
democratic political process.1 210 Perry asserts that "[i]t simply will
not do to assume that the character of our national commitment to
majoritarianism is clear and admits only of a severely restricted ju-
dicial function."211
207. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 67 (citing Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political
Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810, 820-32 (1974)) (footnote
omitted).
208. Id. at 219 n.118. Choper makes the same point, offers the same qualifications,
and then similarly abandons the systemic perspective to focus on the isolated institution-
actor. See J. CHoPrE, supra note 147, at 27.
209. Many of the laws challenged in fundamental rights litigation are old. And the
abortion funding laws, upheld in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (nontherapeutic),
and Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980) (therapeutic), suggest that an intense interest
group may exercise powers to carve exceptions out of even new legislation.
210. L. TRiBE, supra note 21, at 51.
211. Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 20, at 712.
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B. The Justification for Democracy
The critics' shifts of focus between the system and individual actor,
and their use of "majoritarianism" and "democracy" sometimes as
synonyms and sometimes in contradistinction, manifest the dilemma
of Madisonian democracy. Any hope for resolution lies in understand-
ing how the scholars justify their commitment to democracy. As it
turns out, the very justifications create and sustain both horns of the
dilemma.
1. Consent
Professor Bork asserts that the Madisonian dilemma is resolved
by the model of government embodied in the structure of the
Constitution, a model upon which popular consent to limited
government by the Supreme Court also rests .... Society consents
to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain en-
during principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond
the reach of majorities by, the Constitution.21 2
His allusions to consent imply a justification for democracy: In the
words of the Declaration of Independence, democracy is the means
by which governments derive "their just powers from the consent of
the governed."
"Consent" refers either to the actual consent of members of the
American polity or the "hypothetical consent" invoked by political
philosophers such as Locke and Rawls.213 Neither concept helps re-
solve the Madisonian dilemma. If actual consent means mere acqui-
escence, then the tradition of fundamental rights adjudication, how-
ever picaresque, establishes our consent to the practice. If consent must
be informed and knowingly and freely given, then it is doubtful that
any particular institutional practice can claim consent.21 4 And if con-
sent is a heuristic metaphor that allows theorists to speculate about
what people under certain circumstances might have consented to,
one faces the problem that different philosophers have found hypo-
thetical consent for schemes ranging from Hobbes's monarchy to
Locke's democratic minimal state to Rawls's welfare state. Consent
212. Bork, supra note 27, at 2-3.
215. See generally Pitkin, Obligation and Consent (pt. 1), 59 AM. PoL Sci. REv. 990
(1965); Pitkin, Obligation and Consent (pt. 2), 60 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 39 (1966) (analyzing
consent theories).
214. See J. TUSSMAN, OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC (1960). See also D. HUME,
Of the Original Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL. Woxn 443 (T. Green & T. Grose eds. 1964).
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cannot ultimately resolve the Mad'sonian dilemma because the in-
stitutional arrangements involved-what kind of judicial review un-
der what circumstances, or indeed, whether there should be any ju-
dicial review at all-are too detailed to be derived from any general
theory. Consent may get you in the right ballpark, but once there
it cannot distinguish among blades of grass. As Owen Fiss has written:
Consent goes to the system, not the particular institution; it op-
erates on the whole rather than each part. The legitimacy of par-
ticular institutions, such as courts, depends not on the consent
-implied or otherwise-of the people, but rather on their com-
petence, on the special contribution they make to the quality of
our social life.2 15
Consent theories simply cannot resolve questions of institutional au-
thority and competence.
2. Utilitarianism
Bork alternatively suggests a utilitarian rationale for democracy
and for rejecting fundamental rights adjudication. He observes that
every action individuals take to gratify themselves potentially im-
pinges on the gratifications of others-there are no wholly "private"
gratifications: "Every clash between a minority claiming freedom
and a majority claiming power to regulate involves a choice between
the gratifications of the two groups. ' 216 And he implies that majority
rule, subject to constitutional limitations imposed by the majority
itself, maximizes the net gratifications of society. John Ely makes this
utilitarian justification even more explicit:
The way [utilitarianism] connects with democracy is fairly ob-
vious. It is possible to assert, I suppose, that the best way to find
out what makes the most people happy is to appoint someone to
make an estimate, but no one could really buy this idea. The
more sensible way, quite obviously, is to let everyone register
her own preference . . . .Thus democracy is a sort of applied
utilitarianism .... 217
215. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HAIM.
L. REv. 1, 38 (1979) (footnote omitted). Of course, one can still argue that judicial
review is likely to do more harm than good-for example, that courts will "overprotect"
some individual rights at a cost to the majority's right to govern as it sees fit. But
this position-or, for that matter, its opposite-calls, not merely for empirical study, but
for criteria that determine the content of individual rights. And that is just what the
critics argue cannot be done.
216. Bork, supra note 27, at 9.
217. Ely, supra note 182, at 407. Although this article became a chapter of Democracy
and Distrust, the article's brief discussion of utilitarianism is not included. Early in the
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Ely goes on to argue that the political process emulates an economic
market by reflecting intensities of preference. 218
Leaving aside problems of intensity and other complexities sug-
gested by social-choice theorists, 219 a utilitarian justification for de-
mocracy faces the liminal problem that utilitarianism is a highly
controversial ethical theory.220 One source of controversy arises be-
cause, as Ely notes, "[m]any, perhaps most, of us will feel so strongly
about certain things that we will at some point be moved to qualify
the utilitarian balance with a set of Thou Simply Shall Not's called
'rights,' 'side constraints,' or perhaps something else." 221 To qualify
utilitarianism in this way, however, makes the Madisonian dilemma
manifestly intractable, and Ely treats the qualification with obvious
distaste. He does, however, wish to modify utilitarianism to deal with
the following concern:
An ethical system that was serious in demanding only the greatest
good for the greatest number would have to count as moral a
world in which 75% of the people systematically promoted their
own happiness at the expense of the other 25% in circumstances
where no one could say there was a relevant difference between
the two classes. Now this is more than a little troubling, in fact if
uncorrected it is fatal .... 222
To remedy this defect, he proposes the equitable constraint of "rep-
resentation-reinforcing" judicial review-the strict scrutiny of laws
that are likely to reflect prejudice against minority groups.
Recall that Ely's Court must count as legitimate such goals as pro-
moting morality and protecting the family, while discounting preju-
dice and dislike.223 He implicitly defends the distinction in terms of
an individual's right to "equal concern and respect"-the same im-
pulse that presumably leads him both to adopt utilitarianism and to
qualify it with the equitable constraint. This concern for the indi-
vidual, however, ultimately renders indefensible a preference for a rep-
book Ely remarks that "nothing in the ensuing analysis depends on it." J. ELY, supra
note 7, at 187 n.14.
218. Ely, supra note 182, at 408.
219. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TuLuxO, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); A. SEN,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970); Barry, Is Democracy Special? in 5 PHIos-
OPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 155 (P. Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. 1979); Feldman, A Very
Unsubtle Version of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, 12 EcoN. INQUIRY 534 (1974).
220. See, e.g., D. HODoSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM (1967); D. LYONS, FOAMS
AND LIMITs OF UTILITARIANISM (1965); J. SMART & B. WILIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST (1973).
221. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 406.
222. Id. at 406 (footnote omitted).
223. See pp. 1094-95 supra.
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resentation-reinforcing rather than fundamental rights model of ju-
dicial review.
First, a relatively minor point: Imagine a judge who is skeptical
about high-sounding justifications for legislation disadvantaging un-
popular minorities (say, homosexuals), who believes that such justi-
fications are often rationalizations for, or at least infected by, prej-
udice,224 and who doubts that courts can readily distinguish betweer.
prejudice and "sincere" moral beliefs.225 Assuming that the judge be-
lieves that courts should ever restrain the majority from imposing their
prejudices on minorities, she would have to choose between erring on
the majority's or the minority's side. If she doubted that she could
successfully employ Ely's strategy (scrutinize the law and uphold it
if the majority's moral beliefs are sincere), she might, prophylactically,
just invalidate laws that she thought did not accord "equal concern
and respect" to members of the minority group. The choice between
Ely's approach and hers depends partly on one's intuitions about
legislative psychology and judicial competence, and partly on the
weight one gives the majority-gratification and individual-respect horns
of the Madisonian dilemma. Utilitarian theory cannot determine the
choice.
Ely's theory of democracy is much more fundamentally flawed,
however. If utilitarian considerations determine the structure of con-
stitutional government, the constitution must be blind to a nonutili-
tarian public morality. Although a utilitarian-based constitution surely
does not prohibit a legislature from promoting morality, it has no
basis for according that objective privileged status over giving vent to
dislike. Both are simply gratifications. Thus, by introducing the dis-
tinction between morality and dislike or prejudice-a distinction es-
sential to any equitable constraint upon utilitarianism and certainly
necessary for representation-reinforcing judicial review-Ely creates
a self-contradictory political theory. The short of it is that Ely's equi-
table constraint is utterly meaningless in the absence of an extra-
utilitarian theory of rights. But as he well recognizes, to admit such
a theory is to admit of fundamental rights adjudication.226
Doubtless, much more can be said about democracy, majoritarian-
224. See G. ALLPoRT, THE NATURE or PREjuDicE 374-76 (1979 ed.).
225. See note 187 supra.
226. Faced with this reality, one might, of course, opt for a pure, unconstrained
utilitarianism. But for the same reason that Ely rejects such a theory-it allows for in-
tuitively horrible results-most readers would probably reject it as well. See note 220
supra (ethical problems of utilitarianism).
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ism, and judicial review to pull us in one direction or another-to-
ward the interests of the majority or of individuals oppressed by the
majority. But there can be no point of equipoise. The Madisonian
dilemma is intrinsic to the liberal state-it springs into existence at
the moment the state is created to mediate among individuals pur-
suing their self-interest-and is not susceptible to resolution within
its own terms.
V. Our World, and Welcome To It?
The world of the fundamental rights controversy is inhabited by
various institutions and actors, including the "majority,"2 27 state leg-
islatures, the United States Supreme Court, individuals, and families.2 28
The fundamental rights controversy is concerned with constrain-
ing the majority acting through their legislatures. Yet the scholars ad-
dress neither legislatures nor the citizenry. They address only the Court
-and, of course, each other. This is so typical of the genre as hardly
to seem worth mentioning. But I would like to pause to ask why
constitutional scholarship is so court-centered. 229
One explanation is that argument aimed at the people or legisla-
tures is "political" and therefore not within the constitutional schol-
ars' domain; but how does talk about sexual behavior, abortions,
and the like become less political as it moves from public forums and
227. Some of the scholars acknowledge that "majority" is an oversimplification. See,
eg., A. Biciar., supra note 10, at 18-19; J. ELY, supra note 7, at 4. None treats the con-
cept as seriously problematic, however. Some scholars outside the fundamental rights
controversy are more skeptical. See, e., note 219 supra (problems of social choice);
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAav. L. REv. 1641, 1647-
48 (1967) (media domination of public discourse); H. Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in
R. WouFF, B. MooRE, & H. MARcusE, A CRMQuE oF PuRE ToLEANcE 95 (1965) (domination).
228. The absence of some other regulars from this world is easy enough to explain.
Congress and administrative agencies seldom make policies in the areas challenged in
fundamental rights cases. But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae,
100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980). And despite the increasing activism of some courts, the state ju-
diciary remains at the periphery of the scholars' vision.
229. Because the scholars focus on the Supreme Court it is worth considering how
they view that institution. The proponents' Court is essentially Bickel's, described at the
beginning of this article. See pp. 1065-66 supra. Their faith in the Court's ability to
discern fundamental rights, as well as the critics' belief that the Court can carry out
their affirmative agendas, are based not on the qualities of the individual Justices-who
are not presented as extraordinarily wise, insightful, or virtuous-but on the Court's
structure and processes. Curiously, none of the scholars looks behind the eloquent de-
sc-iptions of the Court's processes with the eye of a political scientist or sociologist to
consider how the institution actually operates. Curiously also, because it seems difficult
to reconcile with the proponents' apparent confidence in the process, almost no one
seems interested in the Court's opinions-in its explanations for what it is doing and
why-as distinguished from its results. (Dean Wellington's detailed examination of the
opinions in Griswold and Roe v. Wade is unique among the works reviewed above.)
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legislative lobbies to the courtroomt? Another explanation is that the
scholars' expertise lies in the procedures for deciding these issues;
but then one might expect procedural advice to be offered to other
decisionmakers as well. A more plausible explanation lies in our pro-
fessionalization and profession. We learned and we teach the law from
cases. Many of us were law clerks-demi-judges-who (we would like
to believe) shared in the power of judicial decision and who (in our
innermost fantasies) aspire to our adopted fathers'230 seats. For the
present, our exercise of public power rests in the hope that some Jus-
tice will follow our advice.
Beneath these phenomena lies a more basic fact, however: We simply
do not believe that "majorities" and legislatures are willing or able
to engage in serious, reflective moral discourse. To be sure, Bickel
and Wellington speak only of the judiciary's relative competence to
engage in moral discourse, 231 and other commentators refer to a moral
"dialogue" between the Court and other political institutions.23 2 But
if Bickel actually believed that the Justices are "teachers in a vital
national seminar, 233 the contemporary literature evokes not a gradu-
ate symposium but an unruly classroom. The scholars' implicit mes-
sage is that if the Supreme Court does not take rights seriously, no
one will. This view of the legislative process as one of "public choice"
rather than "social good"23 4 is expressed most explicitly by Owen Fiss,
a fundamental rights theorist:
Legislatures ...are not ideologically committed or institution-
ally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values, but
instead see their primary function in terms of registering the ac-
tual, occurrent preference of the people-what they want and what
they believe should be done. Indeed, the preferred status of leg-
islatures under footnote four [of Carolene Products] is largely de-
rived from this conception of their function. The theory of leg-
islative failure, much like the theory of market failure, ultimately
rests on a view that declares supreme the people's preferences. 2 5
The critics do not disagree with this assessment of legislative and
popular processes. Ely describes representation-reinforcing adjudica-
230. Who knows how our world might appear if one could honestly add "or mothers"?
231. See A. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 24-28; Wellington, supra note 19, at 246-49.
232. See Fiss, supra note 215, at 15-16; Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 20, at 718;
Brest, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 7 (Book Review), at 10, 44.
233. A. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 26 (quoting Rostow, The Democratic Character of
Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 193, 208 (1952)).
234. See Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy., 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-57 (1977) (public
choice and public interest models of legislative action).
235. Fiss, supra note 215, at 10.
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tion as an "antitrust" model that "intervenes only when the 'market,'
in our case the political market, is systematically malfunctioning." 230
For Bork, "[t]here is no principled way to decide that one man's grat-
ifications are more deserving of respect than another's or that one
form of gratification is more worthy than another. . . . Legislation
requires value choice and cannot be principled ....- 237
In sum, the scholars on both sides of the fundamental rights con-
troversy share a profound skepticism about the possibility of public
discourse about issues of principle, and ultimately, therefore, about
the possibility of shared, reflectively held public values.238
For a citizen of this world, "participation"-Ely's central and only
acknowledged fundamental value239-is not participation in public
discourse or community. It is, to use Bork's stark utilitarian language,
the opportunity to vote to maximize one's gratifications. The citizens
of this world lack the power-perhaps the only power that citizens,
as distinguished from constituents, can exercise-of participating in
meaningful debate over public values.2 40 The proponents of funda-
mental rights adjudication relegate that function to the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the Court. The critics either deny the very existence of
public values or at most allow them on those rare occasions-1787,
1866-of constitutional revolution.
In this world-our world-the proponents of fundamental values
adjudication seek to protect individuals against the force of an alien
majority by cordoning off areas of personal privacy and autonomy,
while in the absence of any principles that demand otherwise, the
critics let the majority have its head. Wilkinson's and White's almost
frantic concern to protect the family against threats from both sides241
becomes comprehensible as an attempt to salvage the only extant in-
termediate association of any significance-that "haven in a heart-
less world" 242-while other proponents see the traditional family as
an institution readily available to the state as an instrument of so-
cial control. 243
These are not competing political stances. They reflect the con-
236. J. ELY, supra note 7. at 103.
237. Bork, supra note 27, at 10.
238. To be sure, Wellington's and Perry's methodologies depend on consensus; but
they treat conventional morality as a sociological datum, making no warrant for its re-
flectiveness, let alone its validity.
239. See pp. 1093.94 supra.
240. See ARisroTLE, THE Por'rcs 2-8 (E. Barker trans. 1946); H. ARENDT, ON REvo-
LUTioN (1965); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1067-73 (1980).
241. See pp. 1077-79 supra.
242. C. LASCH, HAvEN IN A HEALESS WORL (1977).
243. See Karat, supra note 22 (passim).
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tradiction embraced by any one (," us-what Duncan Kennedy has
described as the "fundamental contradiction-that relations with oth-
ers are both necessary to and incompatible with our freedom":
[I]ndividual freedom is at the same time dependent on and in-
compatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary
to achieve it. Others (family, friends, bureaucrats, cultural fig-
ures, the state) are necessary if we are to become persons at all
-they provide us the stuff of our selves and protect us in cru-
cial ways against destruction ...
But at the same time that it forms and protects us, the universe
of others ... threatens us with annihilation and urges upon us
forms of fusion that are quite plainly bad rather than good. A
friend can reduce me to misery with a single look. Numberless
conformities, large and small abandonments of self to others, are
the price of what freedom we experience in society. And the
price is a high one. Through our existence as members of col-
lectives, we impose on others and have imposed on us hierarchical
structures of power, welfare, and access to enlightenment that are
illegitimate ...
The kicker is that the abolition of these illegitimate structures,
the fashioning of an unalienated collective existence, appears to
imply such a massive increase of collective control over our lives
that it would defeat its purpose. Only collective force seems
capable of destroying the attitudes and institutions that collective
force has itself imposed. Coercion of the individual by the group
appears to be inextricably bound up with the liberation of that
same individual....
Even this understates the difficulty. It is not just that the world
of others is intractable. The very structures against which we
rebel are necessary within us as well as outside of us. We are
implicated in what we would transform, and it in us.2 44
This is the world within which the fundamental rights controversy
takes place. The Madisonian tension-between majority and minority,
legislature and court-is just a partial image of the essential and ir-
reconcilable tension between self and other, between self and self.
This world is not entirely of our own making. In the broadest sense,
Kennedy's description is of the human predicament; more narrowly,
of a society we have inherited and over which we exercise little con-
trol. But if it would be arrogant to think that we could change the
world, it would be even more irresponsible to act as if we couldn't.
To continue the controversy over judicial review and democracy in
244. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205,
211-12 (1979). See also L. TRaIB, supra note 21, at 987-88 (quoted in note 80 supra).
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the terms in which it has been framed is, in effect, to deny the con-
tradiction and thus to limit both our vision and the possibilities for
social change.
For those who share this sense, what then? I do not have an agenda,
but I would like to mention several alternative strategies. One, which
requires the least dislocation, is simply to acknowledge that most of
our writings are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus
briefs ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various
notions of the public good. In one or another form this has been
the staple of legal scholarship and at least has the claims of tradition.
Alternatively, we might turn to history and a broader sort of legal
theory to understand where we are and how we got here.245 That is
also a respected academic tradition, though somewhat less familiar
in legal scholarship.
Finally, the truly courageous-or the most foolhardy-among us
might go the next step and, grasping what we understand of our
situation, work toward a genuine reconstitution of society-perhaps
one in which the concept of freedom includes citizen participation
in the community's public discourse and responsibility to shape its
values and structure.246 Those who explore this route may discover
that in escaping one set of contradictions they have just found them-
selves in another. But we will not know, until despair or hope im-
pels us to explore alternatives to the world we currently inhabit.
245. See, e4., E. PuRCELL, THE Ctsis or Dr.ocRATTI TEoRy (1973); Tushnet, Truth,
Justice, and the American Way: An Irterpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the
Seventies, 57 TEx. L. Rxv. 1307 (1979).
246. See, e.g., H. ARENDr, supra note 240; J. MANSBRDOE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DFmocRAcY
(1980); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DLmocATIc THEoRY (1970); Frug, supra note 240.
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